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Abstract
Deduction chains represent a syntactic and in a certain sense constructive method for proving
completeness of a formal system. Given a formula φ, the deduction chains of φ are built up by
systematically decomposing φ into its subformulae. In the case where φ is a valid formula, the
decomposition yields a (usually cut-free) proof of φ. If φ is not valid, the decomposition produces
a countermodel for φ. In the current paper, we extend this technique to a semiformal system for the
Logic of Common Knowledge. The presence of fixed point constructs in this logic leads to potentially
infinite-length deduction chains of a non-valid formula, in which case fairness of decomposition
requires special attention. An adequate order of decomposition also plays an important role in the
reconstruction of the proof of a valid formula from the set of its deduction chains.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Modal logic may be employed to reason about knowledge. A necessity for this arises for
example when modeling systems of distributed agents, say computers connected over a net-
work. In this setting, an agent knowing some proposition φ in state s is usually understood
as φ holding in all states reachable from s in one step and thus each agent’s knowledge
may be modeled using a respective box operator. Furthermore, through arbitrary nesting
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kretz@iam.unibe.ch (M. Kretz), tstuder@iam.unibe.ch (T. Studer).
1 Research supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2005.06.011
332 M. Kretz, T. Studer / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 331–357of boxes epistemic situations of considerable complexity become expressible. However,
it is well known that any formula of modal logic can only talk about a finite portion of
a model and that this is not sufficient to express certain epistemic situations of particular
interest. One such example often encountered in problems of coordination and agreement
is common knowledge of a proposition φ, which can roughly be viewed as the infinitary
conjunction “all agents know φ and all agents know that all agents know φ and . . .”. In or-
der to express common knowledge in the setting of modal logic, a fixed point extension is
required, yielding the so called Logic of Common Knowledge which was introduced in [5]
and studied extensively from a model-theoretic point of view in [3]. A more proof-theoretic
study of this logic is given in [1] and [2].
In the current study we aim to deepen the proof-theoretic understanding of Logic of
Common Knowledge by giving an alternative completeness proof for an infinitary proof
system for this logic using the method of deduction chains. Deduction chains represent
a syntactic and in a certain sense constructive method for proving completeness of a for-
mal system. Given a formula φ, the deduction chains of φ are built up by systematically
decomposing φ into its subformulae. In the case where φ is a valid formula, the decompo-
sition yields a (usually cut-free) proof of φ. If φ is not valid, the decomposition produces
a countermodel for φ. The method of deduction chains was first introduced by Schütte in
[9,11] and has been used mainly in the proof-theory of systems of first and second order
arithmetic. See [6,8] for applications of the method in this field. In [10] Schütte extends
deduction chains to modal logic and we extend this approach again to accommodate fixed-
point constructs. The main additional difficulty is that the presence of fixed-points requires
a fully deterministic procedure for the decomposition of a given formula in order to guar-
antee fairness in the case of an infinite deduction chain.
We begin our account by giving an introduction to the syntax and semantics of Logic
of Common Knowledge. In particular we will state the infinitary proof system TωKCn , the
completeness of which will be the main goal. In Section 3 we introduce the concept of
deduction chains for formulae of Logic of Common Knowledge and prove some crucial
properties required for the subsequent argument, chiefly fairness and saturation. We then
proceed to prove the so called principal semantic lemma, which represents one half of
the deduction chain argument. The principal semantic lemma secures the construction of
a countermodel in case of an infinite deduction chain. Section 5 takes care of the other
half of the argument, the so called principal syntactic lemma which yields the construction
of a proof from the set of all deduction chains of a formula, if all of these chains are
finite. Completeness is then obtained as a corollary to the two principal lemmata. In the
concluding section we give a short overview of the main completeness argument.
2. Syntax and semantics
The language LnC for Logic of Common Knowledge comprises a set of atomic
propositions p,q, . . . , the propositional connectives ∧ and ∨, the epistemic operators
K1,K2, . . . ,Kn and the common knowledge operator C. Additionally, we assume there is
an auxiliary symbol ∼ to form complements of atomic propositions and dual epistemic op-
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as follows.
(1) All atomic propositions p and their complements ∼ p are LnC formulae.
(2) If α and β are LnC formulae, so are (α ∨ β) and (α ∧ β).
(3) If α is an LnC formula, so are Kiα and ∼ Kiα.
(4) If α is an LnC formula, so are Cα and ∼ Cα.
Often we omit parentheses if there is no possible confusion. We can define the negation
¬α of general LnC formulae α by making use of de Morgan’s laws and the law of double
negation.
(1) If α is the atomic proposition p, then ¬α is ∼ α; if α is the formula ∼ p, then ¬α is p.
(2) If α is the formula (β ∨ γ ), then ¬α is (¬β ∧ ¬γ ); if α is the formula (β ∧ γ ), then
¬α is (¬β ∨ ¬γ ).
(3) If α is the formula Kiβ , then ¬α is ∼ Ki (¬α); if α is the formula ∼ Kiβ , then ¬α is
Ki (¬α);
(4) If α is the formula Cβ , then ¬α is ∼ C(¬α); if α is the formula ∼ Cβ , then ¬α is
C(¬α);
We set
Eα := K1α ∧ · · · ∧ Knα.
The formula Kiα can be interpreted as “agent i knows that α”. Thus Eα means “every-
body knows that α”. We will also need iterations Emα for all natural numbers m, formally
defined by
E0α := , E1α := Eα and Em+1α := EEmα,
where  is taken to refer to some trivially valid formula as for example p∨ ∼ p where p is
an atomic proposition.
The semantics for logics of common knowledge is given by Kripke structures
M= (S,K1, . . . ,Kn,π)
where S is a non-empty set of worlds, K1, . . . ,Kn are binary relations on S and π is a
valuation function assigning to each atomic proposition a subset of S. We say w is a world
of M = (S,K1, . . . ,Kn,π), expressed by w ∈M, if w is an element of S. The truth set
‖α‖M of an LnC formula α with respect to the Kripke structure M = (S,K1, . . . ,Kn,π)
is defined by induction on the complexity of α:
‖p‖M := π(p),
‖ ∼ p‖M := S \ ‖p‖M,
‖ ∨ αβ‖M := ‖α‖M ∪ ‖β‖M,
‖ ∧ αβ‖M := ‖α‖M ∩ ‖β‖M,
‖Kiα‖M :=
{
v ∈ S: w ∈ ‖α‖M for all w with (v,w) ∈Ki
}
,
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‖Cα‖M :=
⋂{‖Emα‖M: m 1},
‖ ∼ Cα‖M := S \ ‖C¬α‖M.
Using these truth sets, we can express that a formula α is valid in a world w of a Kripke
structure M. This is the case if w ∈ ‖α‖M. We will employ the following notation:
M,w |= α :⇐⇒ w ∈ ‖α‖M.
Next, we are going to present the semiformal Tait-style calculus TωKCn for common knowl-
edge. Tait-style calculi [12,14] are one-sided Gentzen calculi which derive finite sets of
formulae. This kind of calculi is particularly well-suited for the study of cut-elimination
and meta-mathematical investigations. TωKCn has been introduced by Alberucci and Jäger [1,
2]. It incorporates an analogue of the ω rule which permits the derivation of the formula
Cα from the infinitely many premises
E1α, E2α, . . . , Emα, . . .
for all natural numbers m  1. The system TωKCn is called semiformal since, as opposed to
formal systems, it has basic inferences with infinitely many premises [11].
The system TωKCn derives finite sets of L
n
C formulae which are denoted by Γ,Δ,Σ,Π, . . .
(possibly with subscripts). Usually we will write for example α,β,Δ,Γ for the union
{α,β} ∪Δ∪Γ . Moreover, if Γ is the set {α1, . . . , αm}, then we use the following abbrevi-
ations:∨
Γ := α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αm,
¬Γ := {¬α1, . . . ,¬αm},
¬KiΓ := {¬Kiα1, . . . ,¬Kiαm},
¬CΓ := {¬Cα1, . . . ,¬Cαm}.
The axioms and rules of TωKCn consist of the usual propositional axioms and rules of Tait
calculi, rules for the epistemic operators Ki with additional side formulae ¬CΔ plus rules
dealing with common knowledge. Note that TωKCn includes neither an induction rule nor a
cut rule.
Definition 2.1. The infinitary Tait-style calculus TωKCn over the language L
n
C is defined by
the following axioms and inference rules:
Γ,p,¬p (ID)
Γ,α,β
Γ,α ∨ β (∨)
Γ,α Γ,β
Γ,α ∧ β (∧)
¬CΔ,¬Γ,α
¬CΔ,¬KiΓ,Kiα,Σ (Ki )
Γ,¬Eα
Γ,¬Cα (¬C)
Γ,Ekα for all k ∈ ω
Γ,Cα
(Cω)
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n
C and derives finite
sets of formulae. It is infinitary only because of the rule (Cω) for introducing common
knowledge. This rule has infinitely many premises and thus may give rise to infinite proof
trees. For arbitrary ordinals α and finite sets Γ of LnC formulae we define the derivability
relation TωKCn α Γ as usual by induction on α.
(1) If Γ is an axiom of TωKCn , then we have T
ω
KCn α
Γ for all ordinals α.
(2) If TωKCn α′i Γi and α
′
i < α for all premises of a rule of T
ω
KCn
, then we have TωKCn α Γ for
the conclusion Γ of this rule.
We will write TωKCn  Γ if T
ω
KCn α
Γ for some ordinal α.
Now we have to mention some structural properties of TωKCn which will be important in
the sequel. The first two, weakening and inversion, are easily shown by induction on the
length of the involved derivations.
Lemma 2.2 (Weakening). If TωKCn α Γ and Γ ⊂ Γ
′
, then also TωKCn α Γ
′
.
Lemma 2.3 (Inversion).
(1) If TωKCn α Γ,φ1 ∧ φ2, then T
ω
KCn α
Γ,φ1 and TωKCn α Γ,φ2.
(2) If TωKCn α Γ,φ1 ∨ φ2, then T
ω
KCn α
Γ,φ1, φ2.
(3) If TωKCn α Γ,Cφ, then T
ω
KCn α
Γ,Ekφ for every k ∈ ω.
Lemma 2.4. If TωKCn α Γ,¬E
kφ for some k ∈ ω, then TωKCn α+1 Γ,¬Cφ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. The base case of k = 1 holds directly by the rule
(¬C). We thus assume TωKCn α Γ,¬E
k+1φ, which by iteration of Lemma 2.3 means
(1)TωKCn α Γ, ¬K1E
kφ, . . . , ¬KnEkφ
and show TωKCn α+1 Γ,¬Cφ by induction on length α of the proof. The case of α = 0 is
trivial, thus assume that the claim holds for all α′ < α. We make a case distinction as to the
last rule applied to derive (1).
Case 1) The last rule was (Ki ) for some 1 i  n: Then there is a formula Kiξ ∈ Γ such
that TωKCn α ¬CΔ1,¬KiΔ2,Kiξ,Σ and ¬KjE
kφ ∈ Σ for all j = i. If we also have
¬KiEkφ ∈ Σ , then the claim is trivial. Otherwise we must have ¬KiEkφ ∈ ¬KiΔ2
and by the premise of (Ki )
TωKCn α′ ¬CΔ1, ¬Δ2, ξ,
336 M. Kretz, T. Studer / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 331–357where α′ < α and ¬Ekφ ∈ ¬Δ2. By the hypothesis of the outer induction TωKCn α
¬CΔ1,¬Cφ,¬Δ′2, ξ , where ¬Δ′2 = ¬Δ2 \ {¬Ekφ}. Therefore, applying (Ki )
yields TωKCn α+1 ¬CΔ1,¬Cφ,¬KiΔ
′
2,Kiξ,Σ , meaning T
ω
KCn α+1 Γ,¬Cφ.
Case 2) The last rule was not (Ki ) for any 1 i  n: In this case the claim follows directly
by applying the hypothesis of the inner induction to the premise of the respective
rule. 
Transfinite induction on the length of derivations yields the correctness of TωKCn with
respect to the semantics for logics of common knowledge. That is we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.5. For all finite sets Γ of LnC formulae, all Kripke structuresM and all worlds
w ∈M we have that
TωKCn  Γ ⇒M, w |=
∨
Γ.
3. Deduction chains
In this section we are going to define the notion of deduction chain in the context of TωKCn .
Schütte [9] originally introduced deduction chains for classical logic. Later, he showed in
[10] how to extend this technique to the case of intuitionistic and modal logics. We adapt
his method and apply it to show completeness of our infinitary fixed point logic.
In the sequel we will make use of the following notation for projections. If a is a tuple
(x, y), then a1 := x and a2 := y.
We start by defining labeled index trees. Such trees will provide the frame on which the
countermodel of a non-valid formula ψ is based. The set of worlds will consist of all nodes
of the labeled index trees of a deduction chain for ψ . The accessibility relation for agent i
will be given the successor relation σi .
Definition 3.1. A labeled index tree is a set I of pairs (k,α), where k is in {0, . . . , n} and
α is a sequence of natural numbers such that I has the following properties:
(1) (0, (0)) ∈ I .
(2) For every m ∈ ω we have that
(
k, (α,m+ 1)) ∈ I for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
implies
(
l, (α,m)
) ∈ I for some l ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(3) If there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with (k, (α,0)) ∈ I , then there exists an l ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that (l, α) ∈ I .
(4) If (k,α) ∈ I and (l, α) ∈ I , then k = l.
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relations on I :
a = b :⇔ a2 = b2
aσib :⇔ a = (j,α) and b =
(
i, (α, l)
)
for some sequence α, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and l ∈ ω
a ≺ b :⇔ a2 is a prefix of b2
a  b :⇔ a = b or a ≺ b
a  b :⇔ (a ≺ b) or
(a2 = (α, l) and b2 = (α, k) and l < k).
Definition 3.3. A literal is a formula of the form p or ∼ p where p is an atomic formula.
A formula φ is reducible if it is not a literal.
A deduction chain for a formula φ is built by decomposing φ. It is crucial for our ar-
gument that this decomposition satisfies certain fairness conditions. In particular, formulae
of the form ∼ Cα need special care. When we treat such a formula for the first time, we
create a new formula ¬E1α. When we deal with it for the second time, then we create
¬E2α and so on. Moreover, if there is another formula ∼ Cβ , we have to pay attention
that we consider ∼ Cα and ∼ Cβ in alternation. In order to guarantee this, we need some
bookkeeping which is achieved using so-called iteration histories.
Definition 3.4. Let LnC|¬C denote the set of all formulae of the language LnC which have
the form ∼ Cβ for some β ∈ LnC. An iteration history is a finite set E ⊂ LnC|¬C × ω × ω
such that for any e, f ∈ E, we have e = f if e1 = f1.
Definition 3.5. Given an iteration history E, we define
domE := {α ∈ LnC|¬C; ∃e ∈ E such that e1 = α}.
Furthermore, for all α ∈ domE and k ∈ ω we define the following functions:
addE(∼ Cβ, k) =
{
E ∪ {(∼ Cβ, k,0)} if ∼ Cβ /∈ domE,
E otherwise,
lookupE(α) = (k, l) where (α, k, l) ∈ E,
ordE(α) =
(
lookupE(α)
)
1,
degE(α) =
(
lookupE(α)
)
2,
maxE =
{
max{ordE(β);β ∈ domE} if domE = ∅,
0 otherwise,
minE =
{
min{ordE(β);β ∈ domE} if domE = ∅,
0 otherwise.
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a finite sequence of formulae of LnC, Δi are finite sequences of formulae of the form ¬α,
where α ∈ LnC and E is an iteration history. We will use  to denote the empty sequence.
The distinguished formula of S is the rightmost reducible formula appearing in Γ , if such
a formula exists. For any finite sequence of formulae Λ, we denote by set(Λ) the set of all
formulae appearing in Λ. We define set(S) := set(Γ ) ∪ domE ,
set+(S) := set(S)∪ {∼ Kiβ;¬β ∈ set(Δ1)}∪ · · · ∪ {∼ Knβ;¬β ∈ set(Δn)},
maxS := maxE , minS := minE and domS := domE . Further, for all formulae β ∈ domS we
set ordS(β) := ordE(β). Let FS be the set of all formula sequences.
A sequence tree is a labeled index tree of formula sequences (see Fig. 1). That is we
annotate each node of the index tree with a formula sequence. In the construction of a
countermodel for a non-valid formula, the sequence at a node will be the basis for defining
the valuation function π at that node. In particular, π will be defined such that if a formula
ψ belongs to the annotation of a node, then ψ will not hold at that node.
Definition 3.7. Let I be a labeled index tree. A sequence tree over I is a function
R : I −→ FS.
We use the notation Ra for R(a), where a ∈ I and define max(R) as max{maxRa ; a ∈ I }.
Furthermore, given a formula α and an iteration history E we define the operation
it(R, α,E) =
{
(E \ {(α, k, l)})∪ {(α,max(R)+ 1, l + 1)} if α ∈ domE,
E otherwise.
Definition 3.8. Let R be a sequence tree over I . Further, let J be the set {a ∈ I ; domRa =
∅}. We define the relation ∗ for all a, b ∈ J as follows:
a ∗ b :⇔ minRa < minRb or [minRa = minRb and a  b].
The redex of a sequence tree is the formula that will be decomposed next. It is basically
found as follows. The rightmost reducible formula of the main sequence of a node a of R
is called distinguished formula of R at a (see Definition 3.6). The redex of R is defined as
the topmost distinguished formula if such a formula exists; otherwise as the formula of the
form ∼ Cα (if such a formula exists) which has to be treated next according to information
given by the iteration histories. If neither of these two conditions apply, then R has no
redex.
Fig. 1. A sequence tree.
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R at a if one of the following two conditions holds:
(1) φ is the distinguished formula of Ra and a is -minimal among all b ∈ I .
(2) There are no distinguished formulae in R, φ ∈ domRa , ordRa (φ) = minRa and a is∗-minimal in R.
Note that for a sequence tree R over I there is at most one a ∈ I and one formula φ
such that φ is the redex of R at a.
Definition 3.10. Let α be a formula, S = (Γ,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E) a formula sequence in a
sequence tree R and Γ ′ the sequence α,Γ . Define the operation
α ◦ S =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S if α is already in Γ,
(Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E) if α not in Γ and not of the form ∼ Cβ,
(Γ,Δ1, . . . ,Δn, addE(α,max(R) + 1)) if α not in Γ and
of the form ∼ Cβ.
Given a finite sequence Λ = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) of formulae and a formula sequence S, we
write Λ ◦ S for α1 ◦ (α2 ◦ (. . . ◦ (αn ◦ S))).
Definition 3.11. A sequence tree R over I is called reducible, if R has a redex. R is called
axiomatic if there exists an a ∈ I and an atomic proposition p, such that
Ra = (Γ,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E)
and both p and ∼ p appear in Γ . Generally, we say that a formula α appears in R at some
a ∈ I if α ∈ set(Ra).
A deduction chain is a sequence Θ0,Θ1,Θ2, . . . of sequence trees. If Θi is axiomatic,
then Θi is the last element of the deduction chain. Θi is also the last element of the de-
duction chain if it does not contain a redex. If Θi is not axiomatic and has a redex ψ at a,
then ψ will be decomposed and a new sequence tree Θi+1 is added to the deduction chain.
Θi+1 is obtained from Θi by removing ψ and adding
(1) ψ1,ψ2 at a if ψ = ψ1 ∨ψ2 (see Fig. 2);
(2) ψ1 or ψ2 at a if ψ = ψ1 ∧ψ2 (see Fig. 3);
(3) ¬ψ1 at every successor of a (and remembering ¬ψ1 at a) if ψ =∼ Kiψ1 (see Fig. 4);
(4) a new successor of a initialized with ψ1 (plus anything remembered at a) if ψ = Kiψ1
(see Fig. 5);
(5) Ekψ1 at a for some k if ψ = Cψ1 (see Fig. 6);
(6) ¬Ek+1ψ1 at a where k is the maximum number of iterations tried at a if ψ =∼ Cψ1
(see Fig. 7).
These six cases will be made precise in the next definition.
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Fig. 3. Type 2 reduction.
Fig. 4. Type 3 reduction.
M. Kretz, T. Studer / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 331–357 341Fig. 5. Type 4 reduction.
Fig. 6. Type 5 reduction.
Fig. 7. Type 6 reduction.
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sequence
Θ0, Θ1, Θ2, . . .
of sequence trees with the following properties:
(1) Θ0 = R.
(2) If Θm is axiomatic or not reducible, then Θm is the last element of the sequence.
(3) If Θm is not axiomatic and reducible, then Θm+1 is derived from Θm in the following
manner:
Let Θm be the sequence tree S over index tree I and let φ be the redex of S at a ∈ I . If
φ /∈ LnC|¬C, then Sa = (Γ,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E) and Γ = Ω,φ,Ω ′, where Ω ′ is a sequence
of non-reducible formulae.
Case 1: φ = ψ1 ∨ψ2
Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I , where
Γ ′ = Ω,Ω ′,
Ta = (ψ1,ψ2) ◦ (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E),
Tb = Sb for all other b ∈ I.
In this case we say that Θm has type 1 successor Θm+1.
Case 2: φ = ψ1 ∧ψ2
Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I , where
Γ ′ = Ω,Ω ′,
Ta = ψ1 ◦ (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E) or
Ta = ψ2 ◦ (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E),
Tb = Sb for all other b ∈ I.
In this case we say that Θm has type 2 successor Θm+1.
Case 3: φ =∼ Kiψ
Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I , where
Γ ′ = Ω,Ω ′,
Δ′i = ¬ψ,Δi,
Ta = (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δ′i , . . . ,Δn,E)
and for all b ∈ I such that aσib
Tb = ¬ψ ◦ Sb
and Tc := Sc for all other c ∈ I .
In this case we say that Θm has type 3 successor Θm+1.
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Let a = (l, α) and k be the smallest number such that (j, (α, k)) /∈ I for
any number j . Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I ∪ {b}, where
b = (i, (α, k)) and
Γ ′ = Ω,Ω ′,
Ta = (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E),
Tb = (ψ,Δi) ◦ (, , . . . , ,∅),
Tc = Sc for all other c ∈ I.
In this case we say that Θm has type 4 successor Θm+1.
Case 5: φ = Cψ
Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I , where
Γ ′ = Ω,Ω ′,
Ta = Eiψ ◦ (Γ ′,Δ1, . . . ,Δn,E) for some i ∈ ω,
Tb = Sb for all other b ∈ I.
In this case we say that Θm has type 5 successor Θm+1.
If φ ∈ LnC|¬C, then we proceed as follows:
Case 6: φ =∼ Cψ Then Θm+1 is the sequence tree T over I , where
Ta = ¬Ekψ ◦
(
Γ,Δ1, . . . ,Δn, it(Θm,∼ Cψ,E)
)
where k = degE(∼ Cψ)+ 1,
Tb = Sb for all other b ∈ I.
In this case we say that Θm has type 6 successor Θm+1.
Definition 3.13. Let φ be an LnC formula. A deduction chain of φ is a deduction chain of
the sequence tree R which is given by the function mapping the index tree {(0,0)} to the
formula sequence φ ◦ (, , . . . , ,∅).
4. Principal semantic lemma
The principal semantic lemma states that if there exists a deduction chain of a formula ψ
which is infinite or ends in a non-axiomatic sequence tree, then there exists a countermodel
for ψ . For this section we assume Θ0,Θ1,Θ2, . . . is such a deduction chain and we let
I0, I1, I2, . . . be the respective labeled index trees.
The Kripke structure KΘ that will serve as countermodel is (roughly) constructed as
Θ0 ∪Θ1 ∪Θ2 ∪ · · · where π(p) = {a;¬p appears at node a}. Fairness in the construction
of the deduction chain ensures that if φ ∈ a, then KΘ,a |= φ. Finally we observe that ψ is
an element of the root of KΘ .
The following three lemmata follow directly from the definition of deduction chain.
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a ∈ Ij for j  i.
Lemma 4.2. For every Θi we have: There does not exist an a ∈ Ii such that for some
atomic formula p both p and ∼ p appear in Θi at a.
Lemma 4.3. For each Θk there exists an l  k, such that Θl has no distinguished formulae.
Lemma 4.4. If R = Θk , ∼ Cβ appears in R at a and ordRa (∼ Cβ) is minimal in R, then
there exists an l  k, such that ∼ Cβ is the redex of Θl at a.
Proof. By definition of deduction chains and the operations it and ◦ there can only be one
formula and one a ∈ Ik , such that ordRa (∼ Cβ) is minimal in Θk . By Lemma 4.3 there
exists an l  k, such that Θl has no distinguished formulae. Then a is ∗-minimal in Θl
and so ∼ Cβ is the redex of Θl at a. 
Lemma 4.5. For every Θk and m 0 there exists an l  k, such that the (finite) set
dΘl (m) :=
{
(∼ Cβ,a);∼ Cβ appears in Θl at a and ord(Θl)a (∼ Cβ)m
}
is empty.
Proof. The claim is trivial if Θk does not contain any formulae of the form ∼ Cα. We thus
assume otherwise and prove the claim by induction on m.
m = 0: The set dΘk (0) can only contain a pair (∼ Cβ,a), where we have
ord(Θk)a (∼ Cβ) = 0.
Since ord(Θk)a (∼ Cβ) must be minimal in Θk by Lemma 4.4 there exists an l  k,
such that ∼ Cβ at a is redex of Θl . Then by the definition of deduction chains
dΘl+1(0) = ∅.
m → m + 1: By the induction hypothesis there exists an l′  k, such that the set
dΘl′ (m) :=
{
(∼ Cβ,a);Θl′ contains ∼ Cβ at a and ord(Θl′ )a (∼ Cβ)m
}
is empty. Thus the set dΘl′ (m + 1) contains only the pair (∼ Cγ, a) such that
ord(Θl′ )a (∼ Cγ ) = m+ 1. Since ord(Θl′ )a (∼ Cγ ) is minimal in Θl′ by Lemma 4.4
there exists an l′′  l′ such that ∼ Cγ at a is the redex of Θl′′ . Therefore, again by
the definition of deduction chains dΘl′′+1(m + 1) must be empty.
Thus we have shown the claim for all m 0. 
Lemma 4.6 (Fairness). If a reducible formula φ appears in Θk at b ∈ Ik , then there exists
an l  k, such that φ is the redex of Θl at b ∈ Il .
Proof. Due to the definition of redex, we must distinguish the following two cases:
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Case 2) φ is of the form ∼ Cψ : Then the claim follows by Lemma 4.5. 
Definition 4.7. Define the Kripke structure KΘ = (SΘ,K1, . . . ,Kn,π) as follows:
(i) SΘ :=⋃ Ii ,
(ii) for each a ∈ SΘ define Ba :=⋃ set(Ri a), where Ri := Θi ,
(iii) π(p) := {a ∈ SΘ ;¬p ∈ Ba}, for each atomic formula p,
(iv) Ki := σi , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We write a ∈ KΘ for a ∈ SΘ .
Lemma 4.8 (Saturation). Let a ∈ KΘ .
(1) If φ ∨ψ ∈ Ba , then φ ∈ Ba and ψ ∈ Ba .
(2) If φ ∧ψ ∈ Ba , then φ ∈ Ba or ψ ∈ Ba .
(3) If Kiφ ∈ Ba , then there exists a node c ∈ KΘ , such that aKic and φ ∈ Bc .
(4) If ∼ Kiφ ∈ Ba , then ¬φ ∈ Bc for all c ∈ SΘ such that aKic.
(5) If Ekφ ∈ Ba for some k ∈ ω, then there exists a c ∈ SΘ , reachable in k steps from a
such that φ ∈ Bc .
(6) If ¬Ekφ ∈ Ba for some k ∈ ω, then ¬φ ∈ Bc for all c ∈ SΘ reachable in k steps from a.
(7) If Cφ ∈ Ba , then Ekφ ∈ Ba for some k ∈ ω.
(8) If ∼ Cφ ∈ Ba , then ¬Ekφ ∈ Ba for all k ∈ ω.
Proof. All claims are consequences of Definitions 3.12, 4.7 and Lemma 4.6. 
Lemma 4.9. For every formula φ ∈LnC and every a ∈ SΘ
(1) If φ ∈ Ba , then KΘ,a  φ.
(2) If ¬φ ∈ Ba , then KΘ,a  φ.
Proof. We prove the claims by induction on the structure of φ.
φ = p: (1): p ∈ Ba Lemma 4.2⇒ ∼ p /∈ Ba ⇒ a /∈ π(p) ⇒ KΘ,a  p.
(2): ¬p ∈ Ba ⇒ a ∈ π(p) ⇒ KΘ,a  p.
φ = ∼ p: Dually to the previous case.
φ = ψ1 ∧ψ2: (1): ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∈ Ba Lemma 4.8⇒ ψ1 ∈ Ba or ψ2 ∈ Ba
ind.hyp.⇒ KΘ,a  ψ1 or KΘ,a  ψ2 ⇒ KΘ,a  ψ1 ∧ψ2.
(2): ¬(ψ1 ∧ψ2) ∈ Ba Lemma 4.8⇒ ¬ψ1 ∈ Ba and ¬ψ2 ∈ Ba
ind.hyp.⇒ KΘ,a ψ1 and KΘ,a ψ2 ⇒ KΘ,a ψ1 ∧ψ2.
φ = ψ1 ∨ψ2: Dually to the previous case.
φ = Kiψ : (1): If Kiψ ∈ Ba , then by Lemma 4.8 there exists a c ∈ SΘ such that aKic and
ψ ∈ Bc. Thus by induction hypothesis there exists a c ∈ SΘ such that aKic
and KΘ, c  ψ . Therefore KΘ,a  Kiψ .
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Thus by induction hypothesis KΘ, c  ψ for all c ∈ SΘ such that aKic and
therefore KΘ ,  Kiψ .
φ =∼ Kiψ : (1): If ∼ Kiψ ∈ Ba , then by the previous case KΘ ,  Kiψ . Thus also KΘ,a 
¬Kiψ .
(2): ¬ ∼ Kiψ is the formula Kiψ . Thus if ¬ ∼ Kiψ ∈ Ba , then by the previous
case KΘ,a  ψ . Therefore KΘ,a ∼ Kiψ .
φ = Cψ : (1): If Cψ ∈ Ba , then by Lemma 4.8 Ekψ ∈ Ba for some k ∈ ω. Then, again
by Lemma 4.8 there exists a c ∈ SΘ which is reachable from a in k steps
and ψ ∈ Ba . Thus by induction hypothesis there exists a c ∈ SΘ which is
reachable from a in k steps and KΘ, c  ψ . Therefore KΘ,a  Ekψ and thus
also KΘ,a  Cψ .
(2): If ∼ Cψ ∈ Ba , then by Lemma 4.8 ¬Ekψ ∈ Ba for all k ∈ ω. Thus by induc-
tion hypothesis KΘ,a  Ekψ for all k ∈ ω and therefore KΘ,a  Cψ .
φ =∼ Cψ : (1): If ∼ Cψ ∈ Ba , then by the previous case KΘ,a  Cψ , thus trivially
KΘ,a  ¬Cψ .
(2): ¬ ∼ Cψ is the formula Cψ . Thus by the previous case, if ¬ ∼ Cψ ∈ Ba , then
KΘ,a  Cψ . Therefore, trivially KΘ,a ∼ Cψ
This concludes the proof of (1) and (2) for all cases and thus the claim is shown. 
An immediate consequence of the previous lemma is the principle semantic lemma
stated as follows.
Lemma 4.10 (Principle semantic lemma). Let φ be a formula of LnC. If there exists a
deduction chain of φ which does not end with an axiomatic sequence, then we can find a
Kripke structure M and a world w such that M,w |= φ.
5. Principal syntactic lemma
The principle syntactic lemma says that if all deduction chains for a formula ψ end in
axiomatic sequence trees, then there exists a proof of ψ in TωKCn . Hence, together with the
principal semantic lemma we obtain either a proof or a countermodel for each formula ψ
of LnC. This amounts to a (constructive) completeness result for TωKCn .
The principle syntactic lemma is proven along the following lines.
(1) Code each sequence tree R in the deduction tree (consisting of all deduction chains)
of ψ as a set of formulae CR.
(2) Show that TωKCn  C
L for each leaf L of the deduction tree.
(3) Show by induction along the Kleene–Brouwer ordering of the deduction tree that
TωKCn  C
R if TωKCn  C
S
i for all successors Si of R.
(4) Finally, observe CR = ψ for the root R of the deduction tree.
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They state that (in certain cases) the rules of TωKCn may also be applied deep inside L
n
C
formulae. These lemmata are shown first.
Definition 5.1. We extend the alphabet of the language LnC by a propositional variable x.
Let LnC,x be the set of all formulae over this new alphabet. Let φ and ψ be formulae in
LnC,x. φ[ψ] shall denote the formula which results from substituting all occurrences of x
in φ with ψ . Furthermore, we define LˆnC to be the set of all formulae of LnC which are
of the form p, ∼ p, Kiβ , ∼ Kiβ or ∼ Cβ for some β in LnC. Let dis LˆnC denote the set of
disjunctions over elements of LˆnC.
Definition 5.2. Let # denote the natural sum operation on ordinals. For all formulae α ∈ LnC,
we inductively define a complexity measure comp(α) as follows:
1. comp(α) = 1 for all α ∈ LˆnC,
2. comp(α ∧ β) = 1# comp(α)# comp(β),
3. comp(α ∨ β) = 1# comp(α)# comp(β),
4. comp(Cα) = ωcomp(α).
Furthermore, given a finite set Γ = {γ1, . . . , γl} ⊂ LnC, we define
comp(Γ ) = comp(γ1)# · · ·# comp(γl).
Remark 5.3. By Definition 5.2 we have comp(Ekξ) < comp(Cξ) for any formula ξ of LnC
and any k ∈ ω. Furthermore, for any finite Γ ⊂ LnC we have comp(Γ ) |Γ |. In particular,
we have comp(Γ ) = |Γ | if Γ ⊂ LˆnC.
Definition 5.4. We inductively define the subsets Akx of LnC,x as follows:
A0x := {φ ∈ LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ x and ψ ∈LnC},
Ak+1x :=
{
φ ∈LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ Kiδ[x] where ψ ∈ dis LˆnC and δ[x] is in Akx
}
.
Furthermore we define Ax as
⋃Akx and for φ ∈ Ax depth(φ) as the least k, such that
φ ∈Akx .
Lemma 5.5. Let A be a formula in Ax and Γ be a finite subset of LˆnC. The following
implications hold:
1. If TωKCn Γ,A[E
kφ] for every k ∈ ω, then TωKCn Γ,A[Cφ].
2. If TωKCn Γ,A[φ] and T
ω
KCn
Γ,A[ψ], then TωKCn Γ,A[φ ∧ψ].
3. If TωKCn Γ,A[∼ Cφ ∨ ¬E
kφ] for some k ∈ ω, then TωKCn Γ,A[∼ Cφ].
Proof. All three clauses are shown by induction on d := depth(A).
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thus consider the induction step and assume that
TωKCn αk Γ,ψ ∨ Kiδ[E
kφ]
for all k ∈ ω where depth(δ) = d . Therefore, by iterated applications of Lemma 2.3 and
the fact that ψ ∈ dis LˆnC we have
(2)TωKCn αk Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[E
kφ]
for all k ∈ ω and suitable ψ1, . . . ,ψl . We claim that
(3)TωKCn Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[Cφ]
and distinguish two cases:
(i) For some m ∈ ω Kiδ[Emφ] was obtained by weakening in the derivation of (2), say
after some βm  αm.
(ii) For all k ∈ ω Kiδ[Ekφ] was obtained by an application of the rule (Ki ) in the derivation
of (2), each one say after βk  αk respectively.
In case (i) we may instead conclude Kiδ[Cφ] after βm and due to the fact that Γ,ψ1, . . . ,
ψl ⊂ LˆnC we may use the same inferences henceforth to conclude TωKCn Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,
Kiδ[Cφ].
In case (ii) by the premise of the rule (Ki ) we have for each k ∈ ω
(4)TωKCn ¬CΔ
k
1,¬Δk2, δ[Ekφ]
where ¬CΔk1 ⊂ LˆnC and ¬Δk2 ⊂ LnC are suitable finite sets of formulae. Now define Γ ′ :=
Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl , Γ ′|¬C := {∼ Cξ ∈ Γ ′} and Γ ′|¬Ki := {ξ ;∼ Kiξ ∈ Γ ′}. By the fact that Γ ′ ⊂
LˆnC the following two statements hold for every k ∈ ω:
(5)¬CΔk1 ⊂ Γ ′|¬C,
(6)¬Δk2 ⊂ ¬Γ ′|¬Ki .
Clearly, we also have
(7)Γ ′|¬C ⊂ Γ ′,
(8)¬KiΓ ′|¬Ki ⊂ Γ ′.
By Lemma 2.2, (4), (5) and (6) we get
(9)TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,¬Γ ′|¬Ki , δ[Ekφ]
for every k ∈ ω. We show that
(10)TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,¬Γ ′|¬Ki , δ[Cφ]
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mark 5.3. But in this case ¬Γ ′|¬Ki is either empty or a subset of LˆnC. Therefore, the claim
follows by induction hypothesis of the outer induction. Now assume that the claim holds
for all γ ′ < γ . Then there exists a set Σ ⊂ LnC and formulae ξ1, ξ2, ξ such that one of the
following three cases holds
(a) Σ,ξ1 ∧ ξ2 = ¬Γ ′|¬Ki and comp(ξ1), comp(ξ2) < comp(ξ1 ∧ ξ2),
(b) Σ,ξ1 ∨ ξ2 = ¬Γ ′|¬Ki and comp(ξ1), comp(ξ2) < comp(ξ1 ∨ ξ2),
(c) Σ,Cξ = ¬Γ ′|¬Ki and by Remark 5.3 comp(Ekξ) < comp(Cξ) for all k ∈ ω.
Case (a): By (9) and Lemma 2.3 we have
TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,Σ, ξ1, δ[Ekφ] and TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,Σ, ξ2, δ[Ekφ]
for all k ∈ ω. Thus by the induction hypothesis of the inner induction
TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,Σ, ξ1, δ[Cφ] and TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,Σ, ξ2, δ[Cφ]
and again by the rule (∧) we obtain the claim.
Case (b) and case (c) are treated in analogous ways, using Lemma 2.3. From (10) us-
ing (Ki ), we obtain TωKCn Γ
′|¬C,¬KiΓ ′|¬Ki ,Kiδ[Cφ]. With (7), (8) and Lemma 2.2 we
conclude TωKCn Γ
′,Kiδ[Cφ]. Thus (3) holds in both cases (i) and (ii). Then, by an iterated
application of (∨) TωKCn Γ,A[Cφ] follows and this clause is shown.
Clause 2. The base case of d = 0 follows by Lemma 2.3, the rule (∧) and finally an
application of the rule (∨). The induction step is analogous to Clause 1 only that in this
case we are dealing with just two premises instead of infinitely many.
Clause 3. The base case of d = 0 follows by Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4. We therefore consider
the induction step and assume that TωKCn α Γ,ψ ∨Kiδ[∼ Cφ∨¬E
kφ], where depth(δ) = d .
Therefore, by iterated applications of Lemma 2.3 and the fact that ψ ∈ dis LˆnC we have
(11)TωKCn α Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[∼ Cφ ∨ ¬E
kφ].
For suitable ψ1, . . . ,ψl . We claim that
(12)TωKCn Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[∼ Cφ]
and distinguish two cases:
(i) Kiδ[∼ Cφ ∨ ¬Ekφ] was introduced by weakening in the derivation of (11), say after
some β < α.
(ii) Kiδ[∼ Cφ ∨ ¬Ekφ] was obtained by the rule (Ki ) in the derivation of (11).
In case (i) we may instead introduce Kiδ[∼ Cφ] with weakening after β and due to the
fact that Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl ⊂ Lˆn we may use the same inferences henceforth to conclude theC
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kφ] for suitable sets Δ1 and
Δ2. Then by induction hypothesis and an identical argument to the corresponding case in
Clause 1 we obtain
TωKCn ¬CΔ1,¬Δ2, δ[∼ Cφ].
The rule (Ki ) yields TωKCn ¬CΔ1,¬KiΔ2,Kiδ[∼ Cφ]. Then by the fact that Γ,ψ1,
. . . ,ψl ⊂ LˆnC, we may use the same inferences again to arrive at the claim. Thus (12)
holds in both cases (i) and (ii). Therefore, by an iteration of the rule (∨) we arrive at
TωKCn Γ,A[∼ Cφ] and the clause is shown. 
Definition 5.6. Let ψ1, . . . ,ψl be formulae of LnC. We inductively define the subsets
Bkx,ψ1,...,ψl of LnC,x as follows:
B1x,ψ1,...,ψl := {φ ∈ LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ ¬Kiψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Kiψl ∨ Kix and ψ ∈ LnC},
Bk+1x,ψ1,...,ψl :=
{
φ ∈LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ Kiδ[x] where ψ ∈ dis LˆnC and
δ[x] is in Bkx,ψ1,...,ψl
}
.
Furthermore we define Bx,ψ1,...,ψl as
⋃Bkx,ψ1,...,ψl and for φ ∈ Bx,ψ1,...,ψl depth(φ) as the
least k, such that φ ∈ Bkx,ψ1,...,ψl .
Lemma 5.7. Let B be a formula in Bx,ψ1,...,ψl and Γ be a finite subset of LˆnC. If TωKCn
Γ,B[φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl], then TωKCn Γ,B[φ].
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on d := depth(B).
d = 1: We thus have TωKCn α Γ,ψ ∨ ¬Kiψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Kiψl ∨ Ki (φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl)
and with iterated applications of Lemma 2.3
(13)TωKCn α Γ,ψ,¬Kiψ1, . . . ,¬Kiψl,Ki (φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl).
We show that TωKCn Γ,ψ,¬Kiψ1, . . . ,¬Kiψl,Kiφ by induction on α. The base
case of α = 0 is trivial. Therefore, we assume that the claim holds for all α′ < α
and distinguish cases, as to whether or not Ki (φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl) was the
distinguished formula of the last inference used to derive (13). If it was the distin-
guished formula, then we have
TωKCn Δ,¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψl,φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl
for some suitable set Δ. Hence, with an iteration of Lemma 2.3 we obtain
TωKCn Δ,¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψl,φ and thus applying (Ki ) we arrive at the claim. If
Ki (φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl) was not the distinguished formula, then we distinguish
further cases for the last rule applied to obtain (13). In the cases of the rules (∧),
(∨), (Cω) and (¬C) we simply use the induction hypothesis of the inner induction
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1  j  n) we see that Ki (φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl) can only have been obtained
with weakening. Thus we may obtain Kiφ instead in the same manner.
d → d + 1: Thus TωKCn α Γ,ψ ∨Kiδ[φ∨¬ψ1 ∨· · ·∨¬ψl] and by iteration of Lemma 2.3
(14)TωKCn α Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl]
for suitable ψ1, . . . ,ψl . We claim that TωKCn Γ,ψ1, . . . ,ψl,Kiδ[φ] and again dis-
tinguish two cases:
(i) Kiδ[φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl] was obtained by weakening in the derivation
of (14).
(ii) Kiδ[φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl] was obtained by the rule (Ki ) in the derivation
of (14).
In both cases we may show the claim as before using the fact that Γ,ψ1, . . . ,
ψl ⊂ LˆnC. Then by an iteration of the rule (∨), we arrive at TωKCn Γ,A[φ] and the
lemma is shown. 
Definition 5.8. Let ψ1 be a formula of LnC. We inductively define the subsets Ckx,ψ1 of LnC,x
as follows:
C1x,ψ1 :=
{
φ ∈ LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ ¬Kiψ1 ∨ Ki (x ∨ α1)∨ · · · ∨ Ki (x ∨ αp)
and ψ,α1, . . . , αp ∈LnC
}
,
Ck+1x,ψ1 :=
{
φ ∈ LnC,x;φ = ψ ∨ Kiδ[x] where ψ ∈ dis LˆnC and δ[x] is in Ckx,ψ1
}
.
Furthermore we define Cx,ψ1 as
⋃Ckx,ψ1 and for φ ∈ Cx,ψ1 depth(φ) as the least k, such that
φ ∈ Ckx,ψ1 .
Lemma 5.9. Let C be a formula in Cx,φ and Γ be a finite subset of LˆnC. C denotes the for-
mula ofLnC which results from erasing every disjunct of the form x in C. If TωKCn Γ,C[¬φ],
then TωKCn Γ,C
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on d := depth(C).
d = 1: Thus TωKCn α Γ,ψ ∨ ¬Kiφ ∨ Ki (¬φ ∨ α1) ∨ · · · ∨ Ki (¬φ ∨ αp) and by repeated
applications of Lemma 2.3
(15)TωKCn α Γ,ψ,¬Kiφ,Ki (¬φ ∨ α1), . . . ,Ki (¬φ ∨ αp).
We claim that TωKCn Γ,ψ,¬Kiφ,Kiα1, . . . ,Kiαp by induction on α. The base
case of α = 0 is trivial. Thus we assume that the claim holds for all α′ < α and
make a case distinction as to whether or not Ki (¬φ ∨ αj ) was the distinguished
formula of the last inference used to derive (15) for any 1 j  l. In the first case
we then have TωC Δ,¬φ,¬φ ∨ αj and thus with Lemma 2.3 TωC Δ,¬φ,αj .Kn Kn
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guished formula for any 1 j  l, then we distinguish further cases for the last
rule applied to obtain (15). In the cases of the rules (∧), (∨), (Cω) and (¬C) we
simply use the induction hypothesis of the inner induction on the premise and ap-
ply the same rule again. In the case of rule (Kh) (for any 1 h n) we see that
for every 1  j  l Ki (¬φ ∨ αj ) can only have been obtained with weakening.
Thus we may obtain Kiαj for every 1 j  l in the same manner.
d → d + 1: This part of the induction is analogous to the corresponding part in the proof
of Lemma 5.7. 
Definition 5.10. Let R be a sequence tree over I and a = (l, α) ∈ I . We define the charac-
teristic set CRa of R at a inductively as follows:
(1) If a is a leaf of I , then CRa := set+(Ra).
(2) If a has successors b1, . . . , bm ∈ I and
b1 =
(
p1, (α, q1)
)
...
...
bm =
(
pm, (α, qm)
)
,
then CRa := set+(Ra)∪ {Kp1
∨
CRb1} ∪ · · · ∪ {Kpm
∨
CRbm}.
Lemma 5.11. If R is an axiomatic sequence tree over I , then TωKCn C
R
(0,(0)).
Proof. Since R is axiomatic, there exists a c ∈ I and some atomic formula p, such that p
and ∼ p are both in CRc . Thus using (ID) we obtain TωKCn C
R
c . We show that TωKCn C
R
b for
all b c by induction inverse to the length of c.
b = c: This case is already shown above.
b ≺ c: Let b = (k,β). Then there exists a d  c such that d = (i, (β, l)) for some natural
numbers i and l. By induction hypothesis TωKCn C
R
d , thus an iteration of applica-
tions of (∨) yields TωKCn
∨
CRd . Then, applying (Ki ), we obtain TωKCn C
R
b .
Thus the claim holds and since (0, (0)) c the lemma is shown. 
Lemma 5.12. Let R be a sequence tree with redex φ ∨ ψ and S be the type 1 successor of
R. If TωKCn C
S
(0,(0)), then T
ω
KCn
CR(0,(0)).
Proof. This claim trivially holds since TωKCn C
S
(0,(0)) and T
ω
KCn
CR(0,(0)) are the same set of
formulae. 
Lemma 5.13. Let R be a sequence tree with redex φ ∧ψ and S,T be the type 2 successors
of R. If TωC CS and TωC CT , then TωC CR .Kn (0,(0)) Kn (0,(0)) Kn (0,(0))
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as well as A[φ ∧ ψ] =∨CR(0,(0)). Therefore, the claim holds by Clause 2 of Lemma 5.5
and iterations of Lemma 2.3. 
Lemma 5.14. Let R be a sequence tree with redex ∼ Kiφ and S be the type 3 successor of
R. If TωKCn C
S
(0,(0)), then T
ω
KCn
CR(0,(0)).
Proof. Since S is the type 3 successor of a sequence tree with redex ∼ Kiφ, there exists a
formula C ∈ Cx,φ such that C[¬φ] =∨CS(0,(0)) and C =∨CR(0,(0)). Therefore, the claim
holds by Lemma 5.9 and iterations of Lemma 2.3. 
Lemma 5.15. Let R be a sequence tree with redex Kiφ and S be the type 4 successor of R.
If TωKCn C
S
(0,(0)), then T
ω
KCn
CR(0,(0)).
Proof. Since S is the type 4 successor of a sequence tree with redex Kiφ, there exist for-
mulae ψ1, . . . ,ψl and a formula B ∈ Bx,ψ1,...,ψl such that
B[φ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ψl] =
∨
CS(0,(0))
and B[φ] = ∨CR(0,(0)). Therefore, the claim holds by Lemma 5.7 and iterations of
Lemma 2.3. 
Lemma 5.16. Let R be a sequence tree with redex Cφ and Si where i ∈ ω be the type 5
successors of R. If TωKCn C
Si
(0,(0)) for all i ∈ ω, then TωKCn C
R
(0,(0)).
Proof. There exists a formula A ∈ Ax, such that A[Ekφ] = ∨CSk(0,(0)) and A[Cφ] =∨
CR(0,(0)). Therefore, the claim holds by Clause 1 of Lemma 5.5 and iterations of
Lemma 2.3. 
Lemma 5.17. Let R be a sequence tree with redex ∼ Cφ and S be the type 6 successor of
R. If TωKCn C
S
(0,(0)), then T
ω
KCn
CR(0,(0)).
Proof. There exists a formula A ∈Ax, such that
A[∼ Cφ ∨ ¬Ekφ] =
∨
CS(0,(0))
for some k ∈ ω and A[∼ Cφ] = ∨CR(0,(0)). Therefore, the claim holds by Clause 3 of
Lemma 5.5 and iterations of Lemma 2.3. 
Definition 5.18. Let R be a sequence tree. The deduction tree of R denoted by DT(R) is
the set of all deduction chains of R, closed under initial segments. For Θ,Θ ′ ∈ DT(R) we
say Θ Θ ′ if and only if Θ is a proper initial segment of Θ ′. For all finite Θ ∈ DT(R) we
define last(Θ) to be the last sequence tree in Θ (see Fig. 8).
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In order to establish the principal syntactic lemma we require the following consequence
of a standard result about the Kleene–Brouwer ordering on a well-founded tree. Proofs of
this result may be found in [4, Corollary 5.4.18] and [13, Lemma V.1.3].
Lemma 5.19. Let R be a sequence tree. If the deduction tree DT(R) contains only finite
deduction chains, then there exists an ordinal α and a bijective function f :α+1 → DT(R),
such that for all ordinals β,γ  α
f(β) f(γ ) ⇒ γ < β.
Lemma 5.20 (Principle syntactic lemma). If every deduction chain of R ends with an
axiomatic sequence tree, then TωKCn C
R
(0,(0)).
Proof. By assumption the deduction tree DT(R) contains only finite deduction chains.
Thus we may apply Lemma 5.19 to obtain a function f and an ordinal α with the described
properties. It suffices to show
(16)TωKCn C
last(f(β))
(0,(0))
for all β  α, since last(f(α)) = R. We prove (16) by transfinite induction on β .
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last(f(β)) is axiomatic and the claim follows by Lemma 5.11.
(16) holds for all βˆ < β: If last(f(β)) is axiomatic, then the claim holds again by Lemma
5.11. Otherwise last(f(β)) has a redex φ. We distinguish between the different
possibilities for φ and use Lemmata 5.12–5.17. The case of φ = ψ1 ∨ψ2 is given
as an example. In this case there exists an f(γ ), such that last(f(γ )) is the type
1 successor of last(f(β)), thus f(β)  f(γ ). By Lemma 5.19 we have γ < β and
by induction hypothesis TωKCn C
last(f(γ ))
(0,(0)) . Therefore applying Lemma 5.12 yields
TωKCn C
last(f(β))
(0,(0)) . The other cases are treated analogously using the induction hy-
pothesis and applications of Lemmata 5.13–5.17.
Thus (16) holds for all β  α and the claim is shown. 
Combining the principle semantic lemma and the principle syntactic lemma yields com-
pleteness for TωKCn .
Corollary 5.21 (Completeness). Let φ be a formula of LnC. If for all Kripke structures M
and all worlds w ∈M we have that M,w |= φ, then TωKCn  φ.
Proof. Assume we had M,w |= φ for all Kripke structures M and all worlds w ∈M
and φ were not provable in TωKCn . By contraposition of the principal syntactic lemma there
would need to exist a deduction chain of φ which is infinite or ends non-axiomatically.
But in this case the principal semantic lemma would supply us with a countermodel for
φ, contradicting our assumption. Thus φ must be provable in TωKCn and indeed the principal
syntactic lemma constructs such a proof. 
6. Conclusion
In the current study we have given a syntactic method for proving completeness of the
infinitary system TωKCn as is stated more precisely in Corollary 5.21. In the case of a valid
formula φ, a proof of φ in TωKCn may be reconstructed from the principal syntactic lemma
along with Lemmata 5.11 to 5.17 and thus, in this sense, our method is constructive. How-
ever, our analysis does not yet provide us with any statements about the length of canonical
proofs for valid formulae let alone about whether such proofs are optimal in length. On the
semantic side our method also behaves constructively to the extent of providing canon-
ical countermodels for non-valid formulae. This is guaranteed by the principal semantic
lemma. It is known from [3] that Logic of Common Knowledge possesses a strong form
of the finite model property where the size of a countermodel for a non-valid formula φ
may be bounded exponentially in the length of φ. Currently this result is not reflected in
the canonical countermodels constructed by our method, but further refinements should
ultimatively lead to the construction of size-optimal countermodels. As mentioned before,
the main contribution of this study is the extension of the deduction chain method to Logic
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sive modal logics with fixed points as well as the modal μ-calculus in its general form [7]
and thus contribute to a better proof-theoretical understanding of the area in particular with
respect to systematic proof-search and syntactic decision procedures.
An approach similar to the one presented here has recently been undertaken by Tanaka
[15] in the framework of predicate common knowledge logic. Let us briefly compare the
two studies. Tanaka investigates proof systems for CKL, the predicate common knowl-
edge logic for Kripke frames with constant domain. He introduces an infinitary cut-free
deductive system for CKL and proves a completeness theorem about it. Like in our system
TωKCn , Tanaka’s rule for introducing the common knowledge operator has infinitely many
premises. His deductive system is a kind of tree sequent calculus. That means his system
does not derive (sets of) formulae but so-called tree sequents which are finite trees where
each node is a sequent and the edges are labeled by symbols for the agents. A formula φ is
called derivable if the tree sequent which consists only of the root node  φ is derivable.
There is a relation between Tanaka’s approach and the method of deduction chains:
the rules of his calculus correspond to the conditions we impose on deduction chains.
Hence, a branch of a derivation in Tanaka’s system corresponds to a deduction chain in
our approach. In order to prove completeness, he only needs to show the analogue of our
principal semantic lemma: given a non-derivable tree sequent, it is possible to construct a
countermodel. Since we work in the Tait-style system TωKCn which derives sets of formulae
and not tree sequents, we also need the principal syntactic lemma. This lemma states that
if every deduction chain of a formula φ ends axiomatically, then it is provable in TωKCn .
That could be translated into something like if φ is derivable in Tanaka’s system, then it is
provable in TωKCn .
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